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Combating the outbreak of infectious diseases is a major public health imperative for the small 
island-state of Singapore. In this paper we discuss and assess the public health measures taken by the 
Singaporean government to combat the outbreak of SARS in 2003 and H1N1 in 2009. Most notably, 
the state introduced a clear line of command and control to monitor the eﬀ ectiveness and eﬃ  cacy 
of public health control measures as well as to oversee their implementation. Meanwhile, it has 
also employed moral suasion to ensure compliance with draconian health control measures by the 
population. At the same time, the Singapore government also established a close partnership with 
the population to ensure the acquiescence of the general public to these measures. Finally, this paper 
draws on the insights and lessons learned from the two outbreaks to develop a conceptual model for 
pandemic management. 
Keywords: SARS; H1N1; Public Health Control Measures; Infectious Disease; Singapore
Die Bekämpfung des Ausbruchs ansteckender Krankheiten ist ein zentrales Gesundheitsgebot für den 
Inselstaat Singapur. Im vorliegenden Artikel erörtern und bewerten wir die Maßnahmen, welche die 
Regierung Singapurs im Bereich der öﬀ entlichen Gesundheitsversorgung traf, um den Ausbruch von 
SARS im Jahr 2003 und von H1N1 im Jahr 2009 zu bekämpfen. Besonders bemerkenswert ist in diesem 
Zusammenhang die Einführung einer klaren Weisungs- und Kontrollstrategie, um die Wirksamkeit und 
Wirkungen der Maßnahmen zu überprüfen sowie ihre Implementierung beaufsichtigen zu können. 
Zudem wurden moralische Appelle angewendet, um die Einhaltung von drakonischen Maßnahmen zur 
Gesundheitskontrolle durch die Bevölkerung zu gewährleisten. Gleichzeitig etablierte die singapurische 
Regierung eine enge Partnerschaft mit der Bevölkerung, die das Einverständnis der Öﬀ entlichkeit zu 
diesen Maßnahmen sicherstellte. Zum Schluss wird im vorliegenden Aufsatz ein konzeptionelles Mo-
dell, das auf Einsichten und Lehren aus den beiden Ausbrüchen beruft, ausgearbeitet.
Schlagworte: SARS; H1N1; Maßnahmen zur öﬀ entlichen Gesundheitskontrolle; Infektionen; Singapur
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Introduction
Situated in South-East Asia, Singapore is fortunate enough to be spared from ma-
jor natural disasters such as typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis. However, as the 
small city-state is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, Singa-
pore is especially prone to transnational health threats such as pandemics. Indeed, 
during the last decade, Singapore has been struck by two major pandemics. In 2003, 
Singapore experienced the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
(Cutter, 2008; Goh et al., 2006; James, Shindo, Cutter, Ma, & Chew, 2006; Pereira, 2008; 
Tan, 2003). Then, in 2009, the state had to take additional measures against the novel 
influenza A (H1N1), which put major parts of its population at risk (Cutter et al., 2010; 
Ministry of Health, 2009; Tay, Cutter, & James, 2010). 
Even though the two major outbreaks were eventually contained through an ar-
ray of public health control measures instituted by the Ministry of Health (MoH) of 
Singapore, SARS and H1N1  brought about severe public health and economic con-
sequences for the country as a whole (Leo, 2011). As it turned out, the population’s 
receptiveness to draconian measures was enhanced to a large extent through moral 
suasion and close partnership between the government and people. Indeed, the ef-
ficacy of these public health control measures was profoundly related to these two 
crucial elements. Meanwhile, it is important to note that these public health control 
measures were swiftly adjusted to meet contingencies that arose – for example when 
additional epidemiological cases were uncovered and when a better understanding 
of the viruses was developed. This happened through the introduction of a clear line 
of command and control. In terms of capacity building in the design and implemen-
tation of health control policies, the insights drawn from these two episodes of dis-
ease outbreak are invaluable both from a practical as well as a research perspective. 
Indeed, beyond adding to the body of knowledge on this subject, these insights also 
serve to guide the planning of health control policies on a broader level. 
In this paper, we discuss the health control measures introduced as well as the 
insights drawn from the Singapore experience with specific references to SARS and 
H1N1. To achieve our research objective, we utilised a combination of widely-ac-
cepted qualitative methodologies. Firstly, we performed a careful examination of 
official documents released by key institutions such as the Singaporean Ministry of 
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Health and the World Health Organisation (WHO). Secondly, we also examined relevant 
literature on public control measures against communicable diseases to establish our 
conclusions. Thirdly, we evaluated public speeches given by senior leaders in the Singa-
pore government and WHO officials on this particular subject-matter. This broad-based 
methodological approach ensures that our conclusions are both valid and reliable.  
The research contribution of this paper is significant because it offers a fresh per-
spective on the role of the state in pandemic management. Our research also adds to 
the body of knowledge on epidemic policy design specific to the region of South-East 
Asia. Indeed, the dominant perspective in this field holds that the state must be able to 
exercise brute force and impose its will on the population (Lai, He, Tan, & Phua, 2009). 
However, as shown in our paper, this dominant perspective is at least incomplete be-
cause the exercise of authority and power from the government is not a sufficient 
condition to contain the transmission of virulent diseases. Success in fighting epidem-
ics is also contingent on a concerted effort of partnership between health authorities 
and the population at large. Beyond this key finding, this paper also contributes to the 
health policy field by elucidating a conceptual model for pandemic management that is 
applicable to a broader context. 
This paper contains five main sections. Following this introduction, we provide an 
overview of the epidemiology of SARS and H1N1 in Singapore to familiarise readers 
with the chain of events surrounding these two outbreaks. This is then followed by a 
critical discussion of the command and control structures put in place by the Singa-
pore government to combat SARS and H1N1. In the third section, we evaluate the public 
health control measures that were implemented in key healthcare sectors during the 
outbreak of SARS and H1N1. Then, we present the conceptual model for pandemic man-
agement that we have constructed from our findings. In the final section, we discuss 
the implications for pandemic control and management in South-East Asia as well as 
our conclusions.
Epidemiology of SARS and H1N1 in Singapore
The first case of SARS in Singapore was a 22-year-old female Singaporean, who was 
detected by clinicians at Tan Tock Seng Hospital (TTSH) in March 2003 (Centers for 
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Disease Control and Prevention, 2003). But what began as a few isolated cases 
swiftly turned into a major epidemic within a short period of time. The first Sin-
gaporean to contract SARS was hospitalised at TTSH in early March 2003 upon 
her returning from Hong Kong. As it happened, she had been infected by a super-
spreader while staying on the same floor of the Metropole Hotel with the latter. 
The super-spreader, a Chinese physician named Dr. Liu, was later identified by the 
WHO to be the primary source of infection for multiple cases of SARS (Yeoh, 2003). 
Back in Singapore, this Singaporean quickly infected 21 others. Although this indi-
vidual eventually recovered, a number of those infected by her were not as fortu-
nate and finally succumbed to their illness (Ministry of Health, 2003). In late July 
2003, Singapore reported 238 probable cases of SARS and by the time the country 
was removed from the WHO advisory list, 205 (86%) had recovered while 33 (14%) 
had died. A further breakdown reveals that 8 cases (3%) were infected while staying 
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Table 1: Comparison of Characteristics of SARS and H1N1
SARS epidemiCS
November 2002 to July 2003
1 March 2003
SARS Coronavirus (identified 
on 16 April 2003)
Hong Kong, China
Human respiratory droplets, 
contagious when with fever
238
33 cases (14%)
Available (RT-PCR/reverse tran-
scription polymerase chain 
reaction)
Limited (only supportive)
Not available 
Outbreak period
First reported case 
in Singapore
pathogen
Outbreak origin
Transmitting pathway
Total cases in Singapore
death toll in Singapore 
(mortality rate)
Rapid diagnostics
medical treatment
medical prevention
H1N1 pANdemiCS
April 2009 to August 2010 (WHO  
declared a pandemic on 11 June 2010)
26 May 2009
Novel Influenza A virus (identified  
on 24 April 2009)
Mexico and the US
Human respiratory droplets,  
contagious even when without fever
1,348*
18 cases (1.3%)
Available (RT-PCR/reverse transcrip-
tion polymerase chain reaction)
Available (antivirals)
Available (antivirals, vaccines)
Source: Authors’ Compilation From Various Formal Reports
* Refers to confirmed cases admitted to hospitals, representing about 0.6% of the estimated number 
of H1N1 infections in polyclinics and general practitioner clinics.
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abroad whereas 97 cases (41%) were healthcare workers (WHO, 2003). 
H1N1, on the other hand, presented a different set of challenges altogether, as its 
main epidemiological characteristic was radically different from that of SARS (see 
Table 1). Crucially, a H1N1 carrier is contagious even when he or she had mild symp-
toms. SARS, meanwhile, can only be transmitted by the carrier after he or she had de-
veloped a fever. For H1N1, viral shedding begins shortly after infection and before the 
onset of symptoms. In other words, the H1N1 carrier would begin infecting others at 
a preliminary stage without even realising that he or she was stricken. Therefore, it is 
apparent that health control measures to combat SARS and H1N1 had to  be custom-
ised according to their unique epidemiological characteristics (Leung & Nicoll, 2010).
On 26 May 2009, the first case of H1N1 – also a 22-year-old female Singaporean – 
was detected at a local clinic and subsequently sent to a local hospital designated to 
treat H1N1 cases (Ministry of Health, 2009). About three weeks after this case was 
reported, community transmissions (with no links to the first case) broke out at an 
alarming rate. Health authorities in Singapore immediately introduced rigorous con-
tainment measures which eventually brought down the rate of community transmis-
sion. Most notably, at the peak of the H1N1 pandemic (from 26 July to 1 August 2009), 
community outpatient clinics attended to nearly 24,477 cases for acute respiratory 
illness. In the week between 2 August and 8 August 2009, 65.5% of influenza-like 
cases were confirmed to be H1N1. By 9 July 2009, there were 1,301 confirmed cases 
of H1N1 in Singapore (Ministry of Health, 2009). Although the WHO later categorised 
the H1N1 pandemic as one of moderate severity, the public health control measures 
introduced to mitigate the severity of this pandemic undoubtedly contributed in no 
small part to contain this highly contagious pandemic. We will now examine in detail 
the command and control structure implemented by the health authorities in Singa-
pore to mitigate the severity of the H1N1 pandemic.
Command and Control Structure
One of the most important lessons the Singapore government learned from the SARS 
epidemic was the significance of the role of the bureaucracy in crisis management. 
As it turned out, the bureaucratic structure in place prior to the outbreak in 2003 
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was wholly inadequate in terms of dealing with a crisis situation that was both fluid 
and unprecedented (Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010; Menon & Goh, 2005; Pereira, 2008); 
consequently, fighting SARS called for more than a medical approach since resources 
had to be drawn from a number of government agencies that did not fall under the 
rubric of the MoH. 
On 15 March 2003, when the epidemiological nature of SARS was still unclear, the 
MoH initiated a SARS taskforce to look into the mysterious strain. Only two days 
later, after more SARS cases were uncovered and a better epidemiological under-
standing of the strain was developed, the Singaporean government swiftly declared 
SARS a notifiable disease under the IDA (Ministry of Health, 2003). In the event of a 
widespread outbreak, IDA made it legally permissible to enforce mandatory health 
examination and treatment, exchange of medical information and cooperation be-
tween healthcare providers and MoH, and quarantine and isolation of SARS patients 
(Infectious Disease Act, 2003, chapter 137). On 24 March 2003, the MoH was author-
ised by the IDA to implement compulsory home quarantine for those who had been 
exposed to the SARS virus. On 7 April 2003 (approximately five weeks after the first 
case of SARS was reported), a three-tiered national control structure was created in 
response to SARS. These tiers were individually represented by the Inter-Ministerial 
Committee (IMC), the Core Executive Group (CEG), and the Inter-Ministry SARS Op-
erations Committee (IMOC) (Tay & Mui, 2004).  
The nine-member IMC3 was chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs (MHA) and 
fulfilled three major functions: 1) to develop strategic plans, 2) to approve major deci-
sions, and 3) to implement infection countermeasures. Notably, the IMC also played 
the role of interagency coordinator overseeing the activities of other ministries and 
their subsidiaries. The CEG was chaired by the Permanent Secretary of Home Affairs 
and consisted of elements from three other ministries: the MoH, the Ministry of De-
fence (MoD), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). In particular, the role of the 
CEG was to manage the SARS epidemic by directing valuable resources to key areas. 
The IMOC, meanwhile, was seminal in carrying out health control measures issued 
by the IMC and served as the main operational linkage between the MoH and all 
healthcare providers (see Figure 1). 
3   Besides the Ministries of Home Affairs and Health, the Inter-Ministerial Committee comprised eight more 
ministries: Foreign Affairs, Defence, Education, National Development, Manpower, Environment, Transport, and 
Information, Communications and the Arts.
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Following the SARS epidemic, the above command and control structure was revised 
to adequately reflect the need to create a multi-faceted and robust management 
approach – one that would be more suited to a fast changing health crisis situa-
tion that was both volatile and unheralded. The outcome was the establishment of 
a Home-front Crisis Management System (HCMS) (Pereira, 2008). Heading this new 
command and control structure was the Home-front Crisis Ministerial Committee 
(HCMC). Identical to the IMC, the HCMC served to provide strategic and political 
directions during health crises. Meanwhile, the functions of the CEG and IMOC were 
consolidated into the Home-front Crisis Executive Group (HCEG) in order to shorten 
the time it might take to respond to a health crisis (Pereira, 2008). 
During the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, the HCMC for Influenza (HCMC-FLU) was formed 
and it was supported by the HCEG-FLU (see Figure 2). Various ministries and agencies 
also formed interagency working groups called Crisis Management Groups (CMGs). 
Each CMG was in turn headed by a ministry.4 Then in each CMG, a senior MOH repre-
sentative was assigned to bring that ministry’s expertise to the group. Unlike during 
the 2003 SARS outbreak, the 2009 H1N1 outbreak saw the MoH (and not the MHA) 
taking charge of the fight. Among other notable moves, the MoH established a spe-
cial taskforce – a joint effort made up of key policy makers, public health practition-
ers, senior clinicians, and infectious disease specialists – headed by the Permanent 
Secretary of Health to implement all public health control measures and oversee the 
provision of medical services (Tay, Ng, Cutter, & James, 2010). 
4   It is important to point out that during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak various ministries were assigned specific 
responsibilities such as border screening, vaccination, domestic surveillance, and public education.
Figure 1: Singapore’s Organisational Structure for Fighting SARS
inter-minister Committee (imC)
inter-ministerial Operations Committee (imOC)
medical education economyHousing Transport Border Control Other Groups 
when needed
public 
Communication
Source: Adapted from Tay & Mui (2004, p. 35)
Core executive Group (CeG)
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The main benefit of this abridged command and control structure was that it dra-
matically shortened response time and facilitated the implementation of health con-
trol measures across various healthcare sectors during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. 
Noting this, we now turn our discussion to the ways in which these health control 
measures were implemented.
Health Control Measures
Case Management
The manner in which SARS cases were managed clearly illustrates the significance of 
good governance at all levels. In particular, Singapore’s command and control struc-
ture to combat SARS was modelled after an All-in-One approach toward the manage-
ment of SARS patients. Specifically, all suspected cases of SARS were confined to a 
single hospital designated by the MoH – Tan Tock Seng Hospital (TTSH) in this case 
(James et al., 2006; Tan, 2003). This All-in-One approach was unique to Singapore and 
was not found in other SARS-affected countries. Notably, a crucial element of this 
All-in-One approach to case management was that it required close partnership be-
tween three core groups of constituencies: TTSH, the general public, and healthcare 
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Figure 2: Singapore’s Organisational Structure for Fighting H1N1
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Source: Adapted from Tay et al. (2010, p. 316)
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providers (both in public and private practices). 
The mechanics of this unique approach can be delineated into three key steps. Firstly, 
once the government secured full cooperation from TTSH designating it a SARS spe-
cific health institution, it made an unambiguous announcement to medical profes-
sionals and the general public as to where SARS patients can be treated. In practice, 
once a suspected SARS patient was detected at a local clinic or emergency depart-
ment, he or she would be transferred to TTSH immediately for further evaluation and 
monitoring. Secondly, the government also had to divert non-flu patients away from 
TTSH so that the sudden surge in the number of flu cases at TTSH would not paralyze 
its service delivery. As it happened, through the government’s relentless public com-
munication and education, this ad hoc measure ended up receiving strong coopera-
tion and support from the general public. Indeed, by seeking medical treatment from 
other public hospitals for non-flu illnesses, the general public made it possible for 
TTSH to concentrate its scarce resources on SARS-related cases. Lastly, the govern-
ment sought the cooperation of other healthcare providers (such as public hospitals 
and local clinics) so that they would absorb additional cases of non-flu illnesses. 
There is no doubt that by concentrating all SARS patients in one facility, Singapore’s 
health authority was able to achieve disease containment more rapidly (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2003).
As opposed to the All-in-One approach in 2003, the strategy to combat H1N1 in 
2009 took the form of a so-called One-in-All approach. As its name suggests, this en-
tailed a single all-encompassing strategy to counter H1N1, which was necessary since 
the characteristic of H1N1 virus was different (Tay et al., 2010). Unlike SARS carriers, 
H1N1 carriers could be contagious even when they were in the asymptomatic phase 
of the illness (in other words, not showing any visible signs of illness). To minimise 
the risk of transmission, MoH imposed one standardised infection control measure 
on all healthcare settings (such as primary care clinics, long-term care facilities, and 
community renal dialysis centres). Given this imperative, the MoH again needed 
strong compliance from health professionals and the general public. In practice, one 
triage system was implemented in all frontline settings to streamline the treatment 
of H1N1 patients. Once patients were laboratory-confirmed to be stricken with H1N1, 
mandatory isolation orders were issued and quarantine became compulsory. This 
was in accordance with the IDA, which, it must be pointed out, was amended in a 
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timely manner to reflect this imperative (Tay et al., 2010). Furthermore, the MoH also 
established a specific contact tracing centre to track down all laboratory-confirmed 
cases. This meant that those who came into close contact with H1N1 patients were 
swiftly tracked down, ordered to undergo mandatory Quarantine Orders (QOs), and 
were given Oseltamivir as a precaution.5 However, mandatory isolation in a setting 
that was external to the traditional healthcare provider did end up raising a wide 
range of legal, political, and ethical issues that could potentially result in a public 
backlash at that policy. Indeed, even though the policy of mandatory isolation was 
arguably quite effective in terms of limiting transmission, such a draconian measure 
did challenge the public’s acceptance of it, especially those who were isolated since 
that presented an abrupt disruption in their lives and work (Duncanson, 2003). To 
mitigate such public displeasures, the Singapore government endeavoured to provide 
the affected a comprehensive livelihood support by enlisting the assistance of non-
governmental organisations. At the same time, the population was encouraged to 
adopt responsible social behaviours (James et al., 2006). We shall discuss this aspect 
in greater detail in the sections on physical distancing and isolation/quarantine.
Surveillance
Disease surveillance is central to combating pandemics because it can serve three 
critical functions. Firstly, surveillance helps to identify patterns of disease progres-
sion; secondly, it provides advance warning and detection of impending outbreaks; 
and thirdly, surveillance can even indirectly lower the mortality rate through better 
understanding of the pandemic on hand (Aledort, Lurie, Wasserman, & Bozzette, 
2007; Briand, Mounts, & Chamberland, 2011). At the moment, the surveillance process 
is predominantly carried out by health authorities at major border-crossings (Ansell, 
Boin, & Keller, 2010; Briand, Mounts, & Chamberland, 2011; Jebara, 2004; Bhatia & 
Narain, 2010; WHO, 2009; WHO Writing Group, 2006). Yet, a functional surveillance 
system must also count on timely and accurate disease identification and reporting. 
It is also imperative that the surveillance process can be extended beyond border-
crossings to that of the community-level and this invariably requires close partner-
5   Quarantine orders were served for a period of seven days from the date of last contact with the index case.
Allen Lai Yu-Hung & Teck Boon Tan - Combating SARS and H1N1
ASEAS 5(1)
84 85
ship between the health authorities and healthcare professionals (such as general 
practitioners at the community level, infectious disease specialists, and laboratory 
scientists at hospitals). 
When SARS first emerged, the nature of the virus was largely unknown (Tan, 2006). 
As a consequence, health authorities worldwide were mostly ill-equipped to detect 
suspected cases, let alone monitor them. Similarly, health authorities in Singapore 
encountered this problem. But with the aid of WHO technical advisors, Singapore 
managed to establish identification and reporting procedures in a timely manner. 
Furthermore, the MoH also swiftly expanded on the definitions used by the WHO to 
identify suspected cases of SARS (to include any healthcare workers with fever and/
or respiratory symptoms) in order to widen the surveillance net (Goh et al., 2006; 
Tan, 2006). 
It is important to note that in order to cast a wide surveillance net, the MoH 
needed the cooperation of various targeted groups, such as healthcare workers with 
fever, patients with atypical pneumonia, clusters of three or more healthcare work-
ers in the same work area and so forth. As a result, sick leaves of healthcare workers 
were closely monitored and as the pace of SARS transmission quickened, the Singa-
porean Parliament even amended the IDA on 24 April 2003, requiring all suspected 
SARS cases to be reported to the health authority (MoH) within 24 hours from the 
time of diagnosis (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003). While these 
control measures were laudable, SARS also exposed the weakness of the fragmented 
epidemiological surveillance and healthcare system Singapore had in place at the 
time (Goh et al., 2006). For example, surveillance of healthcare-associated infections 
was not fully instituted in all healthcare facilities in Singapore before SARS. As a re-
sult, atypical clinical presentation of SARS cases, for example, immunocompromised 
patients, managed to evade detection by the surveillance net in place at the time 
(Tan, 2006).
Therefore, when the SARS epidemic was finally put under control, MoH quickly in-
troduced a number of novel surveillance measures to integrate epidemiological data 
and to identify the emergence of a new virulent strain faster. For example, a rigor-
ous measure of thrice-daily temperature surveillance of all healthcare workers was 
introduced by MoH in every institution as well as active surveillance for clusters of 
febrile patients (Goh et al., 2006). Another of MoH’s notable innovations was the es-
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tablishment of an Infectious Disease Alert and Clinical Database system to integrate 
critical clinical, laboratory, and contact tracing information with a new information 
technology infrastructure developed to support the surveillance and management of 
SARS. Drawing heavily on its experience with SARS’s wide-net surveillance, the MoH 
also introduced an enhanced process that consisted of five major formal operational 
components – community surveillance, laboratory surveillance, veterinary surveil-
lance, external surveillance and lastly, hospital surveillance (see Table 2). However, it 
is important to point out that relying exclusively on this formal surveillance system 
might not be judicious from an operational standpoint. Indeed, in the fight against 
H1N1, MoH’s external surveillance system did not play a significant role in providing 
early warning of that outbreak. As it turned out, it was through private partnership 
with health professionals – an informal global network – that MoH was able to obtain 
valuable information on H1N1 (Tay et al., 2010). The formal surveillance process in 
place at the time of the outbreak of H1N1 only fulfilled an ancillary function. 
Physical Distancing 
Physical distancing refers to those measures that sought to limit physical contacts 
at public locations such as workplaces, places of worship, entertainment spots, and 
schools. Accordingly, MoH advocated the practice of physical distancing during the 
outbreak of SARS as well as H1N1. The sole intention of physical distancing was of 
course to limit physical interactions and close contacts in public areas to slow the 
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Table 2: Singapore’s integrative Surveillance System
Type OF SURveiLLANCe 
Community surveillance
Laboratory surveillance 
Veterinary surveillance
External surveillance
Hospital surveillance
OpeRATiONAL COmpONeNT
Community-based reporting of acute respiratory infections
Laboratory testing of influenza viruses to detect new strains
Poultry or the wild bird populations
Infectious diseases in the region and globally
Cases of atypical pneumonia, prolonged unexplained fever and 
sudden death of respiratory infection in all Singapore hospitals
Source: Authors’ Compilation From Various Formal Reports
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rate of disease transmission. During SARS, all kindergartens, after-school centres, 
primary and secondary schools, and junior colleges were closed for two weeks from 
26 March to 6 April 2003. In addition, school children who had stricken siblings were 
advised to stay home for at least 10 days. Beyond that, students who showed flu-like 
symptoms or had travelled to other affected countries were automatically granted 
a seven-day Leave of Absence (Goh et al., 2006). To mitigate the side-effects caused 
by these disruptions, the Ministry of Education (MoE) instituted a number of home-
based learning programmes for those affected. Schools meanwhile were also advised 
to scale down their extracurricular activities in order to minimise physical contacts. 
In all, during the outbreak of H1N1, there were 148 class closures (66 at the primary 
and secondary, 82 in kindergartens) between 28 June and 31 August 2009 (Tay et al., 
2010). 
During the mitigation period, the MoH also advised businesses within the serv-
ice sector to adopt physical distancing countermeasures such as split-team arrange-
ments and allowing staff to work from home (Tay et al., 2010). Those who were at 
higher risk of developing complications if stricken were also removed from frontline 
work to other areas where they were less likely to contract the viruses. The practice 
of physical distancing, however, also drew strong criticisms from businesses that 
suffered economic losses as a result (Duncanson, 2003). It is therefore important 
to point out that the effectiveness of physical distancing remains controversial and 
the practice itself relies heavily on the judgement passed by a selected few (see for 
example, Aledort et al., 2007; Briand, Mounts, & Chamberland, 2006; Gostin, 2006; 
WHO, 2006). Indeed, few studies have been conducted since the SARS outbreak in 
2003 to establish the effectiveness of this control measure. Despite the absence of 
solid empirical data, the WHO nevertheless established a set of general guidelines for 
countries that sought to institute physical distancing to follow, and recommended 
that it should be introduced only in accordance with the severity of the epidemic, 
risk groups affected, and epidemiology of transmission (WHO, 2005). In other words, 
physical distancing should only be introduced when it is supplemented by other 
measures to compensate those who suffered economic losses as a result. Only then 
will physical distancing, as a public health control measure, receive the broad-based 
buy-in that is necessary for it to be effective. 
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Isolation and Quarantine
On 24 March 2003, the MoH invoked the IDA to isolate all those who had been ex-
posed to SARS patients (Ministry of Health, 2003). These “contacts” were quarantined 
for 10 days either at home or at specific centres and were told to take their body 
temperatures twice a day. During the quarantine period, contacts who developed a 
fever (defined as a body temperature higher than 38oC) would automatically be re-
ferred to TTSH for further monitoring and investigation. Meanwhile, the MoH also 
uncovered an old law that granted that ministry the authority to mandate quaran-
tines. As a result, it was able to serve quarantine orders in thousands of suspected 
cases. Harsh penalties, such as hefty fines of more than USD 4,000 or imprisonment, 
were imposed on those who defied quarantine orders (“Singapore Imposes”, 2003). 
In a drastic move reminiscent of a police state, closed circuit cameras were installed 
in the houses of those ordered to stay home to monitor their compliance with the 
quarantine order (“Singapore Imposes”, 2003). At the height of SARS, 12,194 suspected 
cases were ordered to stay home, all of whom were monitored either by cameras or 
in less severe cases, by telephone calls. Initially, when little was known of the epide-
miology of SARS, the average quarantine period for suspected cases was six to eight 
days. However, as the MoH came to understand the disease better, that was signifi-
cantly reduced to just one to three days (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Weekly Average Time From Onset of Symptoms to isolation of SARS Cases
Source:  Adapted from Tan (2003)
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During the H1N1 pandemic, quarantine and isolation were also mandated as part of 
the overall containment strategy (Tay et al., 2010). Similar to the approach taken dur-
ing SARS, patients who demonstrated mild symptoms were ordered by their doctors 
to stay at home as part of the QO. On the other hand, close contacts of index cases 
were issued QOs and quickly admitted to public hospitals for isolation. Contacts who 
were Singaporeans were generally quarantined in their own homes while foreigners 
were assigned to Government Quarantine Facilities. At the same time, experienced 
clinicians were elevated to the status of Health Officers under the IDA and given 
broad authority to issue mandatory isolation orders. 
It is important to point out that empirical evidence based on mathematical model-
ling demonstrated a direct correlation between early quarantine and the number of 
secondary cases generated in subsequent time periods (Lipsitch et al., 2003). In other 
words, the sooner an index case was isolated, the fewer subsequent infections could 
be linked to it. Yet, quarantine, regardless of its effectiveness, received strong criti-
cisms from the general public during the outbreak of SARS and H1N1 due to the in-
vasive nature of that measure (Duncanson, 2003; Menon, 2011). Therefore, it remains 
an ongoing debate in the public policy realm as to where the balance between the 
requirement for disease containment and privacy can be struck when quarantine is 
introduced. 
In response to the public complaints, authorities in Singapore provided economic 
assistance to those individuals and businesses who had been affected by home quar-
antine orders through a Home Quarantine Order Allowance Scheme (Tay & Mui, 2004; 
Teo, Yeoh, & Ong, 2005). At the same time, the MoH worked together with various 
ministerial authorities to provide essential social services to those affected by the 
quarantine order. For example, housing was offered to those who were unable to stay 
in their own homes (because of the presence of family members) during their quar-
antine, ambulance services were provided to those undergoing quarantine at home 
to visit their doctors as well as high-tech communication gadgets (such as webcams) 
for those undergoing quarantine to stay in touch with relatives and friends. 
Healthcare Sector Infection Control Measures 
The view that infection control measures implemented in the healthcare sector can 
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limit the transmission of infectious diseases is widely supported in extant literature 
on this subject (see for example, Aledort et al., 2007; Jeffries, 1995; Pittet, 2001). In-
deed, it is not a matter of dispute that measures that discourage hospital visits in 
non-essential cases while encouraging better personal hygiene and respiratory eti-
quette can help to lower the rate of infection. Therefore, to limit the risk of transmis-
sion in healthcare institutions, the MoH decided to implement a series of stringent 
infection countermeasures that called for the cooperation of all healthcare workers 
(HCWs) and visitors to hospitals during the outbreak of SARS. At the same time, the 
MoH instructed all HCWs to wear appropriate personal protective equipment6 when 
treating patients. Visitors to public hospitals were also advised not to enter areas 
where transmission and contraction were most likely. The movements of HCWs in 
public hospitals were also heavily proscribed during the outbreak. As a result, many 
physicians and nurses were restricted to working in one specific medical facility at 
any time (James et al., 2006; Teo, Yeoh, & Ong, 2005). Unfortunately, except for TTSH, 
these critical measures were not enforced in a number of healthcare sectors until 8 
April 2003, and this oversight led to a number of intra-hospital infections (Goh et al., 
2006). This oversight taught the MoH an important lesson; consequently, stringent 
infection control measures were implemented in all healthcare settings during the 
outbreak of H1N1.
It is important to point out that when H1N1 broke out in 2009, the MoH utilised 
a combination of soft and hard tactics to combat that outbreak. As an example, the 
ministry was soft-handed when it simply reminded all healthcare sectors of their 
social responsibility to limit the transmission of the H1N1 virus (Menon, 2011). It is 
somewhat unfortunate that this form of moral suasion has been given little em-
phasis in extant literature even though there is a growing body of evidence which 
underscores the significance of cooperation between the general populace and the 
government. Meanwhile, the MoH also introduced heavy-handed measures such as 
restricting the movements of HCWs and visitors to hospitals. Even more drastic than 
the measure that was taken during the outbreak of SARS in 2003, the movements of 
HCWs and patients between hospitals were restricted during the outbreak of H1N1 in 
2009. As a matter of fact, only HCWs who provided essential services were permitted 
6   Personal protective equipment includes N95 masks, disposable gloves, gowns, and goggles or visors.
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to move freely from one hospital to another. At the same time, patient movement 
between hospitals was strictly restricted to medical transfers. Moreover, the number 
of visitors to hospitals was also tightly controlled and their particulars were recorded 
during each visit (Leo, 2011). Ultimately, it was not a single infection control measure 
that defeated H1N1 but rather a novel combination of soft-handed and heavy-handed 
measures that ultimately brought the virulent outbreak under control.  
Public Education and Communication
During the SARS and H1N1 outbreaks, the MoH practised a high degree of transpar-
ency and forthrightness when it shared information with the general public (Menon, 
2011). Information was communicated to the public through every conceivable chan-
nel and medium to educate the domestic populace while reassuring the international 
community. For example, a government information channel dedicated to providing 
timely updates was created on the same day – 13 March 2003 – when the WHO issued 
a global alert. A dedicated TV Channel called the SARS Channel7 was also launched to 
broadcast information on the symptoms and transmission mechanisms of the virus-
es (James et al., 2006). As to reach out to a wider audience, the MoH even advertised 
epidemic-related information in local newspapers. National TV stations Channel 8 
and Channel U even made the rare move of using a range of local dialects such as 
Hokkien and Teochew to host live call-in SARS forums.8 As it happened, the outbreak 
of SARS prompted the state media in Singapore to permit such broadcasts underscor-
ing the severity of the situation as well as the will of the state. In addition to mass 
media (for example TV and radio), information pamphlets were distributed to every 
households in the country via the postal service and the MoH website provided con-
stant updates and health advisories to the general public (Menon, 2011).
Throughout the SARS crisis, a single MoH spokesperson acted as the state’s 
mouthpiece to the media (James et al., 2006). In stark contrast to how the Taiwanese 
government handled the SARS outbreak – by allowing numerous medical experts and 
7   As the health crisis deepened in May 2003, television broadcast competitors Singapore Press Holdings (SPH), Media 
Corporation of Singapore (MediaCorp), and StarHub Cable TV joined forces to establish a dedicated SARS Channel, 
which transmitted from noon to midnight each day.
8   It is noteworthy that Singapore stopped broadcasting TV programs in local dialects since the early 1980s (Menon 
& Goh, 2005). The temporary reversal of this government policy was the result of initial media criticism that the 
campaigns needed to be more effectively targeted by reaching out to those people who only understood dialects.
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local health professionals to voice their opinions and provide fodder for the local me-
dia on a daily basis – the Singaporean government’s strategy of presenting one mono-
lithic voice to the media was indeed sensible and commendable (Ho, 2003). At the 
same time, the media in Singapore also acted in a sound manner by assuming a social 
responsible role, which, among others, saw the media establishing a close working 
partnership with the state to help manage the national crisis.9 For instance, the lo-
cal newspaper, The Straits Times, published articles that were largely supportive of 
the health control measures introduced by the government (Menon & Goh, 2005). In 
addition to news and articles that supported the state’s actions, news headlines also 
called on members of the public to change their attitudes and behaviours toward 
personal hygiene. Unquestionably, these unambiguous messages from the state con-
tributed in no small part towards lowering the risk of public panic. Singapore’s open 
and responsive risk communication even earned the small nation-state praises from 
Dr. Osman David Mansoor, a Senior Health Advisor for the UNICEF. Underscoring the 
efficient and almost mechanical manner in which Singapore had handled the SARS 
outbreak, Mansoor commented in particular that “if Singapore cannot get it under 
control, it is going to be very hard to get it under control anywhere else” (Fung, 2003).
It is important to note that during the H1N1 outbreak in 2009, this monolithic 
strategy of public education was also pursued rigorously. Similar to the strategy 
adopted during the outbreak of SARS, the MoH worked closely with the media to 
provide regular and timely updates and health advisories to the general populace 
(Menon, 2011). The public was educated on how to minimise the risk of contraction 
and transmission as well as on how to identify symptoms of influenza. Many public 
and private organisations also displayed prominent signs in front of their building 
entrances that reminded their staff as well as visitors to be socially responsible. 
School children were instructed to wash their hands and take their body temperature 
regularly. The public was told to wear masks and postpone non-essential travels to 
other countries. Once the H1N1 vaccine became available, the MoH also pushed for 
the general public to be immunised.10 However, the vaccination coverage rate in the 
general public was less than 20 percent, that is lower than the level of herd immu-
9   Criticisms come in as a self-censored mechanism exists in Singapore’s media coverage. However, the authors 
argue that the government’s concerted communication serves as a necessary, effective policy instrument to mitigate 
the public panic at the response stage of fighting pandemics. 
10   To be fair, concerns over the vaccines’ safety tempered the general public’s receptiveness toward immunisation.
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nity. A survey conducted in November 2009 among Singapore’s healthcare workers 
(HCWs) revealed fewer than 40 percent of HCWs expressed willingness to receive the 
H1N1 vaccination. The top two concerns preventing vaccination were “fear of side ef-
fects” and “unsure of effectiveness” (Toh et al., 2012). When concerns arose regarding 
the safety of the vaccines, key politicians and ministers took the lead to assuage such 
concerns by getting vaccinated themselves (Menon, 2011).  
Conceptual Model and Implications for Pandemic Management
The draconian health control measures imposed by authorities in Singapore to defeat 
SARS and H1N1 have received heavy criticism both from the West and from within Sin-
gapore itself (“Singapore Imposes”, 2003; Menon, 2011). Indeed, the use of quarantine 
orders during the outbreaks is reminiscent of the kind of measures used only by police 
states. It is conceivable that few countries in the West would have resorted to the use of 
CCTVs to ensure compliance with home quarantine orders. However, the evidence pre-
sented in this paper strongly suggests that such a perspective is incomplete at best. For 
one, the Singapore government did employ gentler approaches in the form of moral sua-
sion and public-private partnerships to combat SARS and H1N1. Guided by this insight, 
we hereby delineate a comprehensive model that is better able to capture the essence 
of Singapore’s success in combating SARS 
and H1N1 (see Figure 4). Crucially, this mod-
el is composed of three critical components 
– adaptive governance, networked partner-
ship, and moral suasion – all of which are 
implicitly or explicitly revealed in the meas-
ures that had been discussed so far in this 
paper. More importantly, this conceptual 
model offers a valuable framework into the 
kind of approach needed to combat future 
pandemics especially in South-East Asia. We 
will now discuss the significance of each el-
ement and its implications.
Figure 4:
A Conceptual model of pandemic Control
Source: Authors’ Compilation
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Adaptive Governance
Adaptive governance, in this context, refers to a clear but flexible command and con-
trol structure that can be swiftly adapted to changing circumstances. Among other 
things, the flexibility endemic to this command and control structure facilitates the 
building of trust between the state and its people (Lai, 2009). This in turn ensures 
that government measures are quickly accepted by the general public.
As shown in this paper, the Singapore government practised adaptive governance 
during the outbreak of SARS and H1N1 by establishing a command and control struc-
ture that was able to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. Indeed, this com-
mand and control structure was reorganised swiftly to deal with the uncertainties 
that stemmed from the outbreaks. When SARS broke out in 2003, the MoH set up a 
taskforce within that ministry even when the definition of SARS remained unclear. 
As more SARS cases were uncovered and better epidemiological information became 
available, the government quickly created the Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) and 
Core Executive Group (CEG) – both of which were instrumental in the design and 
implementation of all public health control measures – to coordinate the operation 
to combat the outbreak. While this overarching governance structure is more or less 
standard worldwide (LaPorte, 2007; ‘t Hart, Rosenthal, & Kouzmin, 1993), the case 
of Singapore is unique in that the nation-state was able to overcome bureaucratic 
inertia and adapt this governance structure to deal with the subsequent outbreak 
of H1N1 in 2009. Indeed, MoH officials swung into action once they realised that 
the IMC–CEG structure was inadequate in terms of facilitating close cooperation be-
tween various key government agencies to tackle the health crisis on hand (Pereira, 
2008). Accordingly, in the post-SARS period, the IMC–CEG structure quickly evolved 
into an influenza-focused Home-front Crisis Ministerial Committee (HCMC-FLU) and 
the Home-front Crisis Executive Group (HCEG-FLU). On top of facilitating close inter-
agency coordination, the strength of this revamped structure was its ability to en-
sure swift response to a pandemic outbreak by implementing health control meas-
ures more effectively and efficiently. 
Singapore’s legal framework also played an adaptive role in terms of facilitating a 
swift response to the outbreak of pandemics. A legacy of Singapore’s British colonial 
past, the Singaporean legislature is well known for passing laws in a swift and ef-
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ficient manner. Using the IDA, MoH declared SARS a notifiable disease on 17 March 
2003 – a mere two weeks after the first imported case. H1N1 was declared a notifi-
able disease on 28 April 2009 – just one day after the WHO raised the alert from phase 
3 to 4 – even when there were no reported cases of H1N1 in Singapore then. More 
importantly, Singapore was able to swiftly amend the IDA during the health crises 
to suit volatile conditions such as when more epidemiological cases were uncovered 
and the viruses were better understood. In particular, the government amended the 
IDA on 24 April 2003 requiring all those who had come into contact with SARS pa-
tients to remain indoors or report immediately to designate medical institutions for 
quarantine. Though vitally important, an adaptive governance structure was not the 
only reason behind the successful defeat of SARS and H1N1 – individual values and the 
interests of different stakeholders were crucial as well (Teo, Yeoh, & Ong, 2005). This 
brings us to the second element of our conceptual model: a networked partnership.
Networked Partnership 
Combating pandemics requires multiple government agencies and private organisa-
tions to work together in close partnership – not unlike that of a network (Lai, 2012; 
Shalala, 1997; Webby & Webster, 2003). While the health authorities of a country 
typically lead such efforts, the inclusion of other departments, agencies, and organi-
sations (including non-governmental ones) is necessary and ultimately, inevitable. 
Indeed, major countermeasures such as public education and surveillance are often 
made possible with the aid of non-health agencies such as the media and schools. 
In Singapore, healthcare delivery is carried out through a variety of providers in the 
public, private, and voluntary welfare organisation sectors. For example, the national 
vaccination program against H1N1 in 2009 involved not only the MoH but also a 
number of other ministries such as the MoE, MoD, MFA as well as entities such as the 
media, public hospitals, and private clinics. Therefore, it is clear that the ability to 
synergise the capacity of various organisations is central to the fight against infec-
tious diseases (Lai, 2012; Leung & Nicoll, 2010; Voo & Capps, 2010). 
In general, every public health control measure introduced by the MoH was well-
received by the public for two main reasons: Firstly, the level of trust Singaporeans 
had for their government was relatively high and support for the party in office was 
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strong. The general sense was that the government needed carte blanche in order to 
combat the pandemics effectively and this in turn allowed various government agen-
cies and departments to push through a series of draconian measures to contain the 
outbreaks. Secondly, the government’s eagerness to enter into a partnership with 
various organisations to combat SARS and H1N1 was also a key reason. One dramatic 
example of this was a joint decision made by both the health and education minis-
tries on 25 March 2003 to close all institutions of learning in Singapore. The decision 
was not made on medical grounds but because principals and general practitioners 
have reported that parents continued to be concerned about the risk to their chil-
dren in schools (Lanard, 2004). Then-education minister Teo Chee Hean assured four 
groups of stakeholders that they were being heard and taken seriously: principals, 
general practitioners, parents, and the general public. “The ministers can’t do eve-
rything the public wants – but the public knows its wishes will be considered,” Teo 
said (Fung, 2003). A shared control with its public not only works for partnership but 
also for moral suasion. 
Moral Suasion 
Moral suasion means the use of a persuasion tactic by an authority to influence and 
pressure but not to force individuals or groups into complicity with a policy (Aimone, 
2010; Barrett, 2007). Public education and risk communication are two indispensable 
components in health crisis management (Reddy et al. 2009; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005). 
The evidence suggests that draconian government measures, such as quarantine and 
travel restrictions, are less effective than voluntary measures (such as good personal 
hygiene and voluntarily wearing of respiratory masks), especially over the long term 
(Bruine, Fischhoff, Brilliant, & Caruso, 2007). Therefore promoting social responsibil-
ity is crucial in terms of slowing the pace of infection through good personal hygiene 
and respiratory etiquette in all settings (Aledort et al., 2007). This, in large part, has 
to rely on public education and risk communication. Indeed, getting the right mes-
sage across to the general public can often be a major challenge, especially when no 
established and respected organisation can act as the central authority for informa-
tion collection and dissemination. Hence, it is absolutely necessary to disseminate 
essential information to the targeted population in a transparent manner.
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Moral suasion is best illustrated in the Singaporean government’s communica-
tion strategy during the outbreak of SARS and H1N1. The lack of knowledge on the 
epidemiology of SARS and H1N1 at the beginning of the outbreaks inevitably led to 
public fear and panic. Throughout the pandemic, the Singaporean government re-
lentlessly raised the level of public awareness on social responsibility and personal 
hygiene. Singapore’s approach to manage public fear and panic was through ensuring 
transparency and building trust (Menon & Goh, 2005). Since earning the trust of the 
public was not a given, political leaders had to be seen as doing and initiating a series 
of countermeasures to reassure the public. One good example was demonstrated 
by Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew who told the media how he never left 
home without his thermometer while Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong lunched with 
local media editors at a hotel restaurant to show Singaporeans that it was safe to 
be in public places (“PM Goh Says”, 2003). Goh deliberately used the story of people’s 
sacrifices during SARS to further indicate the type of character that all Singaporeans 
should embrace:
I believe, however, that Singaporeans are made of sterner stuff. I believe they have fighting spirit. Oth-
erwise, Singapore would have collapsed by now…Take for instance our doctors, nurses and other person-
nel working to help SARS-infected patients. They have conducted themselves magnificently throughout 
the crises. They have displayed great resolve, and a noble sense of professional responsibility. They have 
chosen courage over their fear of SARS…This is the kind of steel in our character that will see Singapore 
through hard times. We should honour them. (Goh, 2003)
All these stories illustrated to the Singapore public the ‘moral virtue’ of political lead-
ers setting an example. By showing the people that government leaders practised 
what they preached, the examples served to ‘naturalise’ and ‘legitimise’ the public 
discourse of ‘social responsibility’ and ‘sacrifice’ for all Singaporean citizens.
Conclusion
The world today is more inter-connected than ever before. International travel, tran-
snational trade, and cross-border migration have drastically increased as a conse-
quence of globalisation. In response to these developments, the approach needed to 
combat a pandemic must also be standardised. Public health control measures such 
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as case management, surveillance, physical distancing, and school closures require 
wide-spread support from the general public for them to be effective. Meanwhile, 
Singapore’s experiences with SARS and H1N1 also strongly suggest that a control 
measure can be effective only when a range of partners and stakeholders (such as 
government ministries, non-profit organisations, and grass-roots communities) be-
come adequately involved. Unilateral actions are simply insufficient and ineffectual. 
This article discussed the health control measures introduced as well as the in-
sights drawn from the Singaporean experience in response to SARS and H1N1. In 
our study of two public health emergencies, we have shown that there was fairly 
widespread public support for control measures that other countries were unwill-
ing to adopt (such as social distancing and quarantine order). The two health crises 
revealed that public compliance is particularly effective and necessary to limit the 
spread of infectious diseases, especially at the early stage of disease containment. As 
it turned out, the population’s receptiveness to these draconian measures was en-
hanced to a large extent through moral suasion and networked partnership between 
the government and the people; indeed, the efficacy of these public health control 
measures was profoundly related to these two crucial elements. While Singapore 
may be unique in many aspects, its experience highlighted the critical importance of 
adaptive governance, networked partnership, and moral suasion in ensuring trans-
parency and public trust when confronting the outbreaks.
Epidemic control in Singapore can therefore lend itself to other countries in the 
region and beyond: a strong command and control governance structure that im-
poses clear and transparent orders to shape the crisis mentality of the people. The 
presence of such a governance structure and the extent to which it is utilised ex-
plains and predicts how well an epidemic can be successfully contained. Whether all 
of these aspects are transferrable elsewhere needs to be assessed in future analysis. 
Nonetheless, this unique discipline certainly has helped Singapore come out of public 
health crises on a regular basis.
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